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Abstract: This report is an analysis of Schrödinger‟s ideas and critique of quantum mechanics around the year 
1935. The literature studied consists mainly in the three papers he wrote around that year and other historical 
literature related to Schrödinger‟s views. After studying Schrödinger‟s works it is clear that some aspects of the 
theory are still to be completely explained, and there is room for new interpretations that maybe could in the future 
give rise to a more intuitive interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The main goal of this report is to find out what was 
Schrödinger‟s view of the orthodox interpretation of 
Quantum Mechanics (Q.M. from now on), which were his 
critiques about the new theory. The question that leads this 
work could be put in words as: there is any reluctance or 
controversy with the established interpretation of Q.M.? 
There is a unique view of the features that appear in the new 
theory or on the contrary is it possible to do not agree with 
the general point of view? In pursuing this goal the three 
papers[1][2][3] Schrödinger wrote around 1935 have been 
studied along with some historical literature[4] about 
Schrödinger‟s view and correspondence[5], in addition of 
other physicists works like the EPR paper[6] and Bohr‟s 
response to it[7].   
While studying the literature we were surprised by the 
amount of information Schrödinger treats in the second of the 
three papers he wrote in 1935, the way he goes deeply in 
every aspect of the theory he develops and follows to his 
ultimate consequences in order to show where the orthodox 
point of view may yield some really strange results. So we 
focused on this paper and studied it deeply and given that it 
clearly shows Schrödinger‟s stand in front of the Copenhagen 
interpretation we decided to mainly treat that paper in this 
report and try to analyse his critiques.  
The present work belongs to the history of physics 
domain and therefore is not meant to be an extensive study of 
a particular aspect of the new theory, rather an overall view 
of some of its main features, going all along with 
Schrödinger exposure of the most unintuitive parts of it. 
The taken approach consists in presenting the ideas in the 
same order they appear in the original paper and later in the 
conclusions section briefly attempt to put them in relation to 
current views. 
This report is structured in four major sections: 
introduction (I), historical context (II), the developing section 
(III) and final remarks (IV) at the end. The developing 
section contains titles which do not appear in Schrödinger‟s 
paper, but which we consider clarifying in order to develop 
the ideas in a well-defined and structured way along this 
work. 
 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
In 1935 Schrödinger published three papers that clearly 
show his critical view about the establishment of the 
orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics. In those days  
Schrödinger was in Oxford, since the year before he left 
Germany because of the disagreement with the Nazi regime. 
At that time Q.M. was quite well established and accepted 
among his colleagues. It includes the matrix mechanics 
(Heisenberg, Born, Jordan), the wave mechanics 
(Schrödinger) and Dirac‟ versions of the theory. After the 
foundational years (1925-1927), that somewhat ended in the 
discussions of the 5th Solvay Conference, comes what some 
historians call “golden age”, when new results are developed, 
highlighting for example, nuclear physics or the first steps 
towards a relativistic versions of the theory. 
Hence in 1935 the general opinion saw the new theory as 
valid: it just needed refining and more experimental 
confirmation to be gathered. As Schrödinger acknowledges in 
a footnote, the reason of his “confession” is the publication of 
the EPR paper, key text in the conception of the term 
“entanglement” that Schrödinger develops in the paper 
treated in this research. Although the “Copenhagen 
interpretation” expression was coined after the war, the 
historical context of Schrödinger‟s paper is an established 
orthodox interpretation, of which the main representatives are 
Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli. 
The three papers he wrote that year were published in the 
same order we include them in the references. Now we go on 
commenting the second one that became known as 
Schrödinger‟s “cat paper”. 
 
III. SCHRÖDINGER’S CAT PAPER 
In order to expose some of the unintuitive conclusions 
that arise when the fundamental ideas of the theory are 
followed to its ultimate consequences, Schrödinger leads the 
reader through the main features of the quantum model, 
starting by comparing it with its classical counterpart. 
Probably the main characteristic of the new theory, the 
one that differentiates it from the old one thus manifesting the 
necessity of having two completely different models, is the 
fact that despite the variables are individually determinable to 
an arbitrary degree of precision, the complete set is not. This 
means that only probabilities are predicted. 
This behaviour is well corroborated through experimental 
testing and expresses itself in the form of the famous 
Heisenberg‟s uncertainty principle relation 
 
                                            (1) 
 
that relates the precision with which two conjugate 
variable values can be obtained, meaning, the more precisely 
one is measured the less accurate the other value will be. 
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Clearly the author accepts the above principle, what he is 
not that positive about is the naming of the variables, which 
use the same name as the ones of the old model even though 
its definition is completely different. As an example he 
analyses the energy of an oscillator and the angular 
momentum of a particle to explain this. 
The angular momentum is usually defined as 
                                
                                 ⃑       ⃑                                          (2) 
 
L is defined in relation to a point but in the new model 
this point is taken arbitrarily to fit the possible sharp values it 
can have, given that only some discrete values are allowed. 
The same happens with the values of the energy of the 
quantum oscillator: only odd multiples of     are allowed in 
comparison with the classical oscillator where a continuum of 
values is permitted.  
The author then questions the reader and himself if maybe 
it is not that the new model just works with probabilities of 
finding measurement results for variables of the old one, and 
that in fact, there is more about it, and one deals with new 
properties that share very little in common with the classical 
ones. 
At this point Schrödinger digs into the concept of reality. 
If only knowledge of half the complete set of variables is 
permitted then which ones are real? Are them all real? Or 
maybe just some of them, the ones with sharp values, or are 
they real depending on the degree of possible accurateness of 
the measurement, what Schrödinger calls a blurred reality? 
Two options are now developed and discussed; the first is 
the one of the variables being all real but its values not 
knowable, while in the second option reality is related with 
the sharpness of the variable values. 
The author explores the first option with a statistical 
approach. The fact that all of the variables are real but 
knowledge of them is ruled out resembles a situation where 
very few information about the system is known but one can 
use canonical ensembles, the so called Gibbs ensembles. 
Using such ensembles one can gather information of the 
system from the average values of the possible different 
states, but Schrödinger denies the possibility of using such 
approach with the same concept stated above with the 
quantum angular momentum: it is not possible to 
continuously vary the distance r and get discrete values for 
the momentum. Another example would be the, again already 
mentioned, quantum oscillator. Using the average of 
continuous values is not possible to get the discrete values the 
new theory predicts. 
The second option that Schrödinger presents is that of the 
variables having a blurred reality. Here is where the famous 
metaphor about the cat paradox appears. It is used to show 
the consequences of accepting the blurred model by 
connecting the quantum scale with the classical one. If a cat 
is put in a box with a poisoning trap that triggers with a 
particle emitted on the decay of a certain substance with fifty-
fifty chance of doing so in a determined period of time, the 
cat becomes then in a superposition of states, it is dead and 
alive at the same time, being measurement, i.e. opening the 
box and seeing the result, the only way to resolve the 
superposition and defining the final state. The author 
intention‟s is clearly to show the weirdness of the blurred 
reality assumption using irony, appealing to the reader 
intuition, cause the cat must „know‟ his state and cannot be in 
a superposition of dead and alive states.  
A. Theory of measurement 
With both options of explaining realism denied 
Schrödinger exposes to the reader what the orthodox 
viewpoint about this matter is, a radical form of epistemology 
in which the only real thing is observation, measurement. 
There is no difference at all between the state of an object 
and what one can know about it, in a way that the whole 
purpose of physics is reduced to the acquisition of 
measurement results, for no relation can be established with 
other realities or models, mental representations are 
forbidden. But this measurement really relies on the 
information about which measurements are possible in 
principle. It needs the definition of what the best possible 
knowledge of an object is.  
In order to further explore this notion of measurement and 
maximum possible knowledge Schrödinger turns his attention 
to the ψ-function, which embodies the sum of acquired 
knowledge about an object and serves as relation between 
measurements, what he calls an expectation catalog. Clearly 
this term has some implicit connotations. It is used 
contemptuously to show the relegated position it now holds, 
for the ψ-function is neither the model nor a state, it is just a 
list of probabilities.  
This catalog changes between measurements in the same 
way as a state of the classical model does, causally, following 
a partial differential equation. But this only applies to an 
unperturbed ψ-function and cannot be used to describe its 
evolution when a new measurement is done, moment at 
which the prediction catalog abruptly changes in a 
completely unpredictable way. Given that this evolution 
depends on the result obtained from measurement, this 
transition has to be non-causal. This is the reason why the ψ-
function cannot be interpreted as the model or as the physical 
state, rejecting the naive realism interpretation which states 
that observation as a natural process cannot interrupt the 
causal flow of natural events.  
Once the expectation catalog is somewhat defined he 
deepens into the concept of measurement, which, in his own 
words “it is the most interesting point of the entire theory.” 
Using the same procedure of following the doctrine 
premises or ideas to its ultimate consequences used all along 
the paper, Schrödinger, once more, starts the following 
section using the conclusions drawn in the preceding one. 
Measuring could be defined as an attempt to determine 
the value a variable has, but if realism is rejected such 
variable has no definite value prior to the measurement so is 
the measured value what determines reality and not the other 
way around. Following this thought Schrödinger proposes a 
criterion to determine if a measurement is valid or not, when 
a measurement is done its result determines reality so it must 
remain the same for all the future iterations of the same 
process, iterations which give rise to error statistics of the 
measurement, therefore establishing a precision parameter. 
At this point Schrödinger goes on explaining two 
different types of measurement repetition and what 
information is gathered when performing each one. 
Treball de Fi de Grau 3 Barcelona, June 2017 
In the above type of repetition the measuring instrument 
expectation catalog must be the same at the beginning of all 
iterations so the same treatment has to be given each time to 
the instrument after every measurement and prior to the next 
one, like a reset function, while the measured object‟s catalog 
remains unperturbed between measurements.   
There exists another type of repetition which consists in 
the same setting as the case stated above, but this time the 
measured object‟s catalog also gets reset each iteration, 
giving rise to another type of statistics, the distribution of the 
predicted possible outcomes probabilities, which in no way 
must be related to an error on the measurement values, rather 
an intrinsic non-deterministic feature of the new theory. 
With the explanation of both types of repetition 
Schrödinger has already laid out the difference between a 
measuring instrument and the measured object. The 
instrument must always be reset to its neutral initial condition 
while for the measured object, is just the opposite, no 
perturbation is permitted if the experimenter‟s intention is to 
obtain error statistics. This difference that characterizes both 
measuring elements fades away when the second type of 
repetition is carried out; in this case roles disappear leaving a 
common object to object interaction in its place.  
The point that catches most of Schrödinger‟s attention is 
the discontinuous change the system undergoes when 
measured. In this paper he tries to describe objectively the 
process of measuring in full detail. Once the concept of 
expectation catalog is explained he explores the property of 
maximality relative to it.  
The ψ-function represents the maximum possible 
information about a system that can be obtained, no more 
knowledge is obtainable, and less knowledge would mean 
that the expectation catalog is not known. He applies this 
assumption to the measuring process, where the catalog gets 
reduced to just one possible outcome, the measured value. 
Because of maximality this implies that some knowledge has 
been lost, rendering the ψ-function incomplete, but in virtue 
of this same property, i.e. maximality, loss of knowledge is 
forbidden, the only way to solve this apparent paradox is 
accepting that there is no change whatsoever in the 
expectation catalog, in fact it is destroyed and a complete 
different new catalog emerges at the end of the measuring 
process.  
 In his attempt to comprehend the interaction between 
measuring instrument and measured object Schrödinger 
makes use of some abstract considerations.  
If the complete system is composed by two different 
subsystems, each of which has its own unique independent ψ-
function, the maximum obtainable knowledge for the 
complete system is also known, and it adds no extra 
information to the individual ones. The reverse argument is 
not true though, in Schrödinger‟s words “Maximal 
knowledge of a total system does not necessarily include total 
knowledge of all its parts”. It is possible for the individual 
catalogs to be related with each other in a way that a 
subsystem‟s catalog statements depend on the other 
subsystem‟s catalog possible outcomes so maximal 
knowledge of a total system does not imply knowledge of 
such relations, thus having incomplete individual expectation 
catalogs. Viewed from another perspective, if the complete 
system‟s ψ-function allowed maximal catalogs for the 
individual subsystems then, because of being maximal, no 
conditional statements could be added, as all the possible 
knowledge is already contained in them. 
This particular case in which some statements of a 
subsystem are dependent on the other subsystem statements 
is what Schrödinger called entanglement, term which he 
coined and is of major relevance nowadays. 
B. Entanglement 
This feature of the new theory is the reason why 
Schrödinger develops so thoroughly the description of an 
extremely common process as measurement. When a 
measurement is carried out the expectation catalog of both 
the measuring instrument and the measured object get 
entangled, as if they merged into a single one. Previous 
knowledge of the whole system, logical sum of the individual 
catalogs, is transformed into conditional statements that relate 
possible results on one subsystem‟s catalog with the possible 
outcomes of the other, having both subsystems no maximal 
catalog of their own.  
If this measurement was made to determine the position 
of a particle for example, the statements in the particle‟s 
catalog would be something like: if the instrument marks 1 
then the particle position is x, if it marks 2 then the position‟s 
value is y, and so on. So it is not until the actual measurement 
happens, when information about the outcome in one 
subsystem is gathered, that the entanglement is resolved 
leaving behind two individual maximal catalogs, one for the 
measuring instrument that contains the information about the 
resulting mark, and another one for the measured object with 
just the resulting state, because, as the doctrine says, it has 
collapsed.   
This simple example reveals a relevant aspect of the 
measurement process of entangled ψ-functions that caught 
not only Schrödinger‟s attention but many other authors too, 
as it will be shown below, namely, the fact that measuring on 
one subsystem also reveals information about the other 
subsystem without interfering with it. 
It‟s also noticeable, following the previous subsection‟s 
reasoning, that the abrupt non-causal change the expectation 
catalog of the measured object seems to suffer is in fact no 
change at all, if one follows the expectation catalog‟s 
definition to its final consequences, as Schrödinger does, will 
have to accept that the object prior and after the measurement 
is not the same, i.e. does not have the same ψ-function, thus 
the term „collapse‟, as if it was a reduction of the original 
catalog,  becomes inappropriate. It does not represent the 
same object.   
Continuing with the entanglement resolution Schrödinger 
leaves behind the measuring-measured object situation and 
sets out a new simpler case in which two subsystems, A and 
B, interact with each other thus becoming entangled. The 
catalog of the complete set is always maximal, but the 
individual ones are not. As recently stated, one can resolve 
the entanglement by measuring on one subsystem, let‟s say 
B, in order to acquire the necessary knowledge about it so its 
individual expectation catalog is maximal, moment at which 
the catalog of A is automatically maximal too, thus both 
subsystems becoming independent again. 
The point here is that A totally depends on B, and so it 
depends on which measurements the experimenter decides to 
perform on B in order to determine its ψ-function, with 
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different approaches leading to different catalogs, and since 
the subsystem A is left undisturbed and its derived catalog 
must be maximal, just as all the possible variations derived 
from the different approaches, then all the obtainable ψ-
functions of A have to be the same independently of the 
chosen approach. But this is simply not true.  
Schrödinger goes on commenting the EPR paper and 
explaining the situation presented in it with his own words. 
Einstein also had difficulties accepting the new doctrine 
as taught by the orthodox or Copenhagen point of view, 
specifically about the concept of reality mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, he thought that variables should 
have a definite value, even when this value is not 
knowledgeable a priori. So he, in collaboration with Podolsky 
and Rosen, wrote a paper in which a particular case of 
entanglement is presented in order to show that is possible to 
have both conjugate variables sharply determined, rendering 
Q.M. incomplete. The problem presented in that paper is 
nowadays known as EPR.  
This particular case of entanglement consists of two 
subsystems, reduced to a single degree of freedom 
determinable by p and q, constrained by the following 
relations,   
     
                                                                   (3) 
                                                                 (4) 
 
where the capital letters correspond to one subsystem, 
called big, and the lowercased to the other one, called small. 
It is worth knowing that q and Q are not defined from the 
same point, so equation (3) relates the two subsystems 
positions but they are no equal. If Q is measured then 
automatically q is determined too and the entanglement is 
resolved, the same happens if the momentum p is measured. 
Given the relation in equation (1) is not possible to have 
sharp values for both p and q at the same time, and that is 
precisely what the EPR attempts to fulfill, if q is measured in 
the small subsystem and P in the big subsystem given the 
above relations both pairs of conjugate variables p, q and P, 
Q get determined. Bohr published a paper fully dedicated to 
resolve this paradox, in it he describes the real objective 
situation of such case and the experimental impossibility of 
measuring both components of the same subsystem, in fact 
that is what the uncertainty principle refers to, measurements. 
The same answer is given by Schrödinger when he explains 
the orthodox point of view about that particular case, given 
that only measurement results are to be considered there is no 
point, from an epistemological standpoint, in asking what 
would have been the result if…, each subsystem, now fully 
independent systems, is constituted only by the resulting state 
of the measurement performed on itself, so there is no 
measurement possible to corroborate the EPR prediction, in 
other words, it is not possible to sharply determine the pair of 
conjugate variables through direct measurement. 
  But this is not what surprises Schrödinger most. He 
explains what really amazes him about entanglement using a 
beautiful metaphor about a student, acting as a subsystem, 
and a teacher asking him questions, being the experimenter 
inquiring about the other subsystem. No matter which 
question is the first one to be asked the student always knows 
the answer, but as soon as the questioning has been initiated 
all further questions are left unanswered. Since the student 
knows the correct answer to the first question, whatever it 
may be, it means he knows the answer to all possible 
questions, he just forgets them all with exception of the first 
one. 
 This metaphor illustrates so clearly how strange the 
situation exposed is and it goes stranger, candidates to the 
first question are not reduced to a simple q or p-question, it 
can be as complex as the teacher, i.e. the experimenter, 
desires. Schrödinger shows as an example the measurement 
or question  
 
                                                           (5) 
 
which result cannot be derived from the values of the 
individual variables. Equation (5), which is the expression for 
the energy of a quantum oscillator with the addition of 
parameter a, proves the above statement. When the value of a 
gets continuously varied the energy values remain discrete, in 
a way that different values of a are associated with the same 
value of the energy. The point is that one subsystem knows 
the answer to any possible combination the experimenter can 
come up with about the other subsystem, as long as it is the 
first question, with the experimenter having no insight at all 
into the mechanisms by which the already-known answers 
relate to each other. 
C. Time 
In the last subsection of his paper Schrödinger addresses 
the issue of time, rather the use of time, in quantum 
mechanics, as in the new theory time is used as parameter 
more than a variable even though it is considered the 
conjugate variable of energy. The entanglement is dependent 
on time, conditional statements in the complete system‟s 
catalog should change with time, but time is not considered 
in the measurement process, as if it was an instantaneous 
action.  
He does not develop further the idea of treating time as a 
full titled variable, just mentions that maybe is this way of 
treating time that makes the whole interpretation of the 
entanglement and other weird behaviors of the new theory so 
strange and confusing. Schrödinger briefly mentions the need 
for a theory that combines both quantum mechanics and 
relativity in order to solve this confusion, in fact this is what 
he worked on the rest of his life, searching a holistic theory, 
one theory that explains all the known aspects of nature and 
includes the separate theories we possess at the moment 
 
IV. FINAL REMARKS 
In this concluding section we try to summarize the main 
ideas or critiques stated in the developing section and try to 
contextualize them in the modern days, a personal opinion 
about the current situation of these aspects of the theory is 
also included. 
 
 The first presented idea is the misuse of the variable 
names, if the behavior or definition of the variable is 
not the same for the two theories maybe another name 
is needed, that would clearly show that two different 
features are in place.  This critique has fallen into 
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oblivion: although the notion that electrons do not 
follow orbits as planets do is well established, the 
same definition of angular momentum is used. I agree 
with Schrödinger on that point, we could help 
ourselves trying not to make an unintuitive theory 
even more confusing by simply getting new names for 
variables that are defined or behave in a different way 
that they do in the classical theory. 
 The realism critique is also valid nowadays, specially 
the one that yields the cat paradox, which could be 
transformed into a question: why there is no 
superposition at all in the classical world? Although 
there have been some attempts to answer it, I think 
that no definitive explanation of this phenomenon has 
been found. But the important aspect is again that this 
controversy, or rather this unconcluded aspect of the 
theory is not shown to the students as a hole in the 
theory that should be explored. 
 Schrödinger does a big effort in explaining the 
measurement process in full detail, and together with 
the explanation of the expectation catalog it is maybe 
the most descriptive part of the whole paper. However 
it has to be put in context, and to bear in mind that at 
that time no one had explained it so thoroughly. 
Personally I found it hard to follow the explanation at 
some parts as the language used feels a bit out of date 
for a modern student.   
 Entanglement is the main theme of the three articles of 
1935-1936, where he develops to its ultimate 
consequences the notion that one can affect and gather 
information about one subsystem without even 
interacting with it, in the last paper of this triad he 
even digs into the concept of steering states, which 
was not commented in this work because the lack of 
space. For me this is the most unintuitive part of the 
paper and even the theory itself. 
 The final critique, the use of time, is maybe the most 
investigated aspect of the theory, because is the bridge 
between relativity and quantum mechanics, new 
approaches like the String theory show that the 
general opinion is well aware of the need for a unified 
interpretation of all the different theories currently 
separated. 
 
As a physics student, after studying Schrödinger works, I 
feel a bit surprised that these features of the theory are not 
really discussed during our training; they are just mentioned 
and used as calculating devices rather than comprehensively 
described. The controversy is never shown and the critiques 
presented by Schrödinger are just ignored. Although there are 
many alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics the 
orthodox or Copenhagen interpretation reigns above all. This 
have profound consequences in the educational system, if all 
this controversy is not shown to the students very few of 
them will work on it, so the situation will be perpetuated in 
time. 
The ideas presented in this work should be interesting to 
every physicist attempting to study or understand nature 
because it really shows the fundamental aspects of the new 
theory and how they are not fully understood. Maybe the 
exposure and debate of the more unintuitive parts of the 
theory could give rise to a new interpretation, one that clearly 
explains all aspects of quantum mechanics without 
unintuitive parts or the need of radical epistemological 
approaches. 
As a final remark, and answering the leading question of 
this report mentioned in the introduction, it is quite clear that 
in its current state the theory is open to numerous 
interpretations and given that there are some obscure or 
unintuitive parts of it, one can say that in the future it will 
have to be reformulated in a way that all this inconsistencies 
fit in with an understandable explanation that satisfies all the 
different theories that the scientific community has come up 
with at the moment. 
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